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An important aspect of health professional’s duty of care is to advise patients of the available 
options of treatment so that the patient can choose the form of treatment that suits her or his 
requirements. As CAM becomes more evidence-based and accepted, medical doctors need to 
consider the extent to which they should provide patients with information about those types 
of treatments. If a CAM treatment option is evidence-based, there is a strong argument that 
medical doctors should advise of this option for treatment to satisfy their duty. CAM 
practitioners should also provide details of options for treatment within their own modality 
but are not obliged to advise of medical options. 
Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) 
is now a significant element in the provision of 
health care services in Australia and the Western 
world generally.1 This level of usage of CAM and 
its increasing use by medical practitioners2 requires 
 
1 In Australia in 1996 it was estimated that at least one in five 
persons used at least one form of CAM, while half the South 
Australian population has used alternative medicine and one in 
five visits a CAM practitioner each year:  
A MacLennan, D Wilson and A Taylor, “Prevalence and Cost of 
Alternative Medicine in Australia” (1996) 347 Lancet 569; A 
Bensoussan and S P Myers, Towards a Safer Choice: The 
Practice of Traditional Chinese Medicine in Australia  (Victorian 
Department of Human Services, New South Wales Department 
of Health and Queensland Department of Health, Nov 1996),  
p 22. It has been calculated that Americans spend approximately 
US$4 billion annually on herbal medicines, with the market 
increasing by 18% per annum: J E Brody, “Americans Gamble 
on Herbs as Medicine: With Few Regulations No Guarantee of 
Quality”, New York Times, 9 Feb 1999.  
2 Recent survey evidence suggests that 20% of Victorian general 
practitioners used one CAM modality, the most popular being 
acupuncture, meditation, and vitamin and mineral therapy:  
M V Pirotta, M M Cohen, V Kotsirilos and S J Farish, 
“Complementary Therapies: Have They Become Accepted in 
General Practice?” (2000) 172 MJA 105. This study also showed 
an assessment of how CAM and orthodox medicine 
(OM) practitioners fit into the ethical and legal 
structure of the health care sector.  
This article deals with the legal and ethical 
obligations of medical practitioners to advise 
patients of options for treatment and the extent to 
which this extends to CAM options. The article then 
discusses the obligation of a CAM practitioner to 
inform patients of OM remedies as part of his or her 
duty of care to patients. 
Complementary and alternative medicine is 
defined as those parts of the health sector that rely 
primarily upon holistic, homeopathic, traditional or 
natural therapies rather than the allopathic approach 
that characterises Western or orthodox medicine. 
Examples of CAM modalities include chiropractic, 
osteopathy, Traditional Chinese Medicine, 
 
that many general practitioners impliedly endorse CAM by 
referring patients for CAM: 10% of those surveyed said they 
referred a client to acupuncture weekly and 5% referred a client 
for chiropractic. 
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acupuncture, herbal medicine, therapeutic massage, 
homeopathy and naturopathy. 
Medical practitioners’ obligation to 
advise of options for treatment 
Based on the ethical principle of autonomy, the 
common law and statute, medical doctors have an 
obligation to provide patients with sufficient 
information to allow them to determine what is, for 
them, the best course of treatment. This obligation is 
reflected in professional guidelines, including those 
of the National Health and Medical Research 
Council.3 The NHMRC Guidelines indicate that 
doctors should discuss with patients the proposed 
approach to treatment and other options for 
investigation, diagnosis or treatment. The Consent 
to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA), s 15(a)-(c), requires the doctor to advise of 
treatment options that are available (including the 
option of no treatment). The relevant legal issues 
are discussed in a number of significant High Court 
decisions.4 These sources are directed to providing 
an information-rich environment that gives the 
patient the opportunity to exercise his or her 
personal autonomy. There is a surprising paucity of 
case law on the specific issue of the extent of the 
duty to advise a patient on the options for treatment 
available to them. Much of the case law in this area 
relates to claims that a patient was not properly 
informed of a material risk of treatment where this 
risk has, in fact, eventuated to the detriment of the 
patient.5  
The High Court in Rogers v Whitaker provided 
the often-quoted test for what is a material risk as 
follows:6 
“[A] doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a 
material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; 
a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be 
 
3 National Health and Medical Research Council, General 
Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information 
to Patients (1993), p 5.  
4 See Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; Chappel v Hart 
(1998) 195 CLR 232; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 
434. 
5 R Mulheron, “Observations upon Causation in Recent Failure to 
Warn Cases” NLR 2000 NLR 2 and “Twelve Tests to Identify 
Whether a Medical Risk Is Material” 2000 NLR 1.  
6 (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 490. 
likely to attach significance to it or if the medical 
practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that 
the particular patient, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to it.”  
An important causation issue in these types of 
cases is whether or not the patient is able to satisfy 
the court that, if appropriately warned of the 
potential risk, he or she would have opted not to 
undertake the procedure.7 Although the High Court 
in Rogers v Whitaker has not emphasised the 
question of discussing options for treatment, the 
principles discussed by the High Court might be 
applied more broadly to give guidance on this point.  
The High Court indicated in Rogers v Whitaker 
that the level of information that should be provided 
by a medical doctor is influenced by:8 
· the nature of the matter to be disclosed;  
· the nature of the treatment;  
· the patient’s desire to be informed;  
· the patient’s character; and  
· other surrounding circumstances. 
These principles could encompass a duty to discuss 
the various options for treatment, including not 
providing treatment at all. This duty is emphasised 
where the contemplated procedure has substantial 
attendant risks and there is evidence that no 
treatment, or a less risky or non-interventionist 
treatment, may prove successful even if it produces 
a lower rate of success. A client complaining of 
back pain would not be well served if one safe but 
often successful alternative to surgery, namely bed 
rest and exercise, was not canvassed. The obligation 
to advise of this option would apply even if this 
procedure did not have the same degree of success 
or permanency as surgery. The necessity to discuss 
the less dramatic intervention is further emphasised 
if the riskier procedure is still possible after the 
more conservative option has proven unsuccessful. 
To deny a patient the information to be able to 
choose the appropriate procedures offends the 
ethical principle of autonomy.  
Case law on options for treatment 
The Canadian case of Haughian v Paine9 
involved a claim against a doctor for negligence and 
 
7 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 239-241, 273; 
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
8 (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 493. 
9 (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624.  
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for not obtaining informed consent for spinal 
surgery. The claimant was diagnosed with a cervical 
disk herniation. The doctor warned the patient of the 
risks of surgery to relieve the condition, such as 
infection, bleeding, neurological dysfunction or 
some weakness. Complications arose during surgery 
when surgical gauze passed into the dura, 
compressing the spinal cord and causing paralysis. 
After this gauze was removed, the claimant 
recovered from the paralysis. He was discharged 
from hospital over two months later. He was 
described as having changed from a healthy, normal 
person to a person with the movements of an old 
man, suffering from severe depression which 
resulted in two suicide attempts. The court 
determined that the doctor was not negligent in how 
the operation was performed but was at fault in not 
advising the patient of the more conservative option 
of bed rest, traction, muscle relaxants, physical 
therapy and analgesics. These treatments came with 
a lower rate of adverse events, though not with the 
same rate of success. The court concluded: 
“In order to enable a patient to give informed 
consent, a surgeon must also, where the 
circumstances require it, explain to the patient 
the consequences of leaving the ailment 
untreated, and alternative means of treatment and 
their risks.”10 
The court concluded that the evidence indicated 
“there was no adequate discussion, if any at all, 
of the consequences of leaving the ailment 
untreated or of undergoing conservative 
management, and that the consequences were, at 
worst, a continuation of pain and discomfort and 
possible need for surgery in the future. The 
appellant was not told that the prospect was that 
the condition might, in a matter of mo nths, very 
well improve, albeit with the prospect of 
recurrence from time to time. If the condition 
deteriorated, surgery was always an option in the 
future. In the absence of such information having 
been given to the appellant, he was not in a 
position to give informed consent.”11  
The obligation to advise of options for treatment 
will normally require some particularity in advice. 
Although the High Court has acknowledged the 
impracticality of requiring “a professional person to 
 
10 (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624 at 639.   
11 (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624 at 639.   
communicate the detail of every tiny complication 
that may accompany medical procedures”,12 this 
advice should deal with the nature of the procedure, 
the apparent risks and success rates. Without that 
detail it would be difficult for a doctor and a patient 
properly to compare the virtues and risks of 
different therapies and procedures. Without that 
information, if a court is subsequently asked to 
consider whether the patient would have proceeded 
with the treatment if armed with the relevant 
information, it would be difficult to ascertain the 
patient’s likely decision. Kirby J stated in 
Rosenberg v Percival  that health providers have a 
duty  
“to inform patients contemplating invasive 
procedures (such as surgery) of the material risks 
involved in the treatment proposed, and any 
available alternatives. Any ‘choice’ by the 
patient, in respect of such procedures, without 
the provision of such information, is 
meaningless.”13 
The issue for medical doctors is whether this 
obligation extends to advice on CAM remedies. 
There is currently no authority that gives clear 
guidance on this specific issue.  
Alternative therapies: A matter of 
semantics? 
The question may be resolved as a matter of 
definition. The medical profession’s emphasis upon 
evidence-based medicine requires a reconsideration 
of the categorisation of distinct OM and CAM 
remedies. The Medical Council of New Zealand, in 
its Guidelines on Complementary, Alternative or 
Unconventional Medicine,14 stated:  
“There cannot be two kinds of medicine – 
conventional and alternative. There is only 
medicine that has been adequately tested and 
medicine that has not, medicine that works and 
medicine that may or may not work. Once a 
treatment has been tested rigorously, it no longer 
matters whether it was considered alternative at 
 
12 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at 478 per Kirby J.  
13 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at 465. 
14 Medical Council of New Zealand, Guidelines on 
Complementary, Alternative or Unconventional Medicine (April 
2000); The Medical Board of Queensland has adapted these 
guidelines for their Board Policy on Complementary, Alternative 
and Unconventional Medicine: see http://www.medicalboard 
.qld.gov.au/files/policies_alternative.html. 
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the outset. If it is found to be reasonably safe and 
effective, it will be accepted. But assertions, 
speculation and testimonials do not substitute for 
evidence. Alternative treatments should be 
subject to scientific testing no less rigorous than 
that required for conventional treatments.”15  
These Guidelines indicate that a doctor who 
recommends an unproved or experimental treatment 
(for example, some CAM remedies) ahead of a 
proven treatment (such as surgery or 
pharmaceuticals) must either:16  
· have broad professional support to do so (the 
example given is the first renal transplant) with 
the patient’s fully informed acceptance and 
consent and the sanction of a formally 
constituted ethics committee (hardly a likely 
scenario for the use of CAM remedies); or 
· “must be prepared to argue, with evidence, that 
the experimental or unproved treatment is safe, 
and that the patient is not harmed by 
withholding the standard therapy”. This 
emphasises the issue of safety for the therapy 
itself and the importance of not delaying the 
standard treatment with the result that the 
condition worsens and becomes untreatable. 
The extent of the required evidence is not 
indicated but the context suggests it would be 
something less than randomised, double-blind 
scientific evidence and could conceivably 
encompass traditional or anecdotal evidence.  
The Guidelines indicate that, where no treatment 
is effective, any treatment must be sanctioned by the 
general opinion of the profession; or where any risk 
to patient safety is present, it should be treated as a 
new therapy requiring the written consent of the 
patient to its use and formal approval from an ethics 
committee.17  
 
15 M Angell and J P Kassirer, “Alternative Medicines – The 
Risks of Untested and Unregulated Remedies” (1998) 339 NEJM 
839.  
16 Medical Council of New Zealand, n 14, p 2. 
17 The Medical Practitioners Act 1995 (NZ), s 109(4), provides 
that a doctor will not be deemed guilty of professional 
misconduct merely because he or she ascribes to a particular 
theory of medicine or healing and has acted honestly and in good 
faith. This provision has proven a bulwark against prosecution of 
doctors using unorthodox methods: see also K Dew, “Limits on 
the Utilization of Alternative Therapies by Doctors in New 
Zealand: A Problem of Boundary Maintenance” (1997) 32 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 181. 
Despite this provision, the Guidelines insist that 
“any doctor who embarks upon a mode of 
investigation or treatment of patients that is not 
based upon evidence of effectiveness acceptable 
to the Colleges and the Council will: … (d) 
advise the patient of the evidence-based and 
conventional treatment options, their risks, 
benefits and efficacy, as reflected by current 
knowledge”.18  
The Guidelines endorse a referral of a client to a 
CAM practitioner “where there is no reason to 
believe such a referral would expose the patient to 
harm”.19 
These provisions illustrate a number of points: 
· If a CAM procedure is supported by scientific 
evidence of efficacy and safety, then there is no 
ethical reason for a medical doctor, if properly 
trained, not to use it in clinical practice. 
According to the Australian Medical 
Association, “evidence-based aspects of 
complementary medicine are part of the 
repertoire of patient care and may have a role in 
mainstream medical practice”.20 
· There is no specific indication that it is 
necessary, when discussing treatment options, 
to advise of unproven CAM therapies. 
· If a CAM procedure is evidence-based, this 
should be one of the potential options discussed 
with a client: it should not be seen as 
“alternative” in nature.  
· There is scope for a medical practitioner to use a 
CAM remedy where there is no concern about 
its safety based upon less than scientific 
evidence. 
The dichotomy between evidence-based and 
unproven or experimental treatment is significant. 
Not all treatments provided in the ordinary course of 
practice by medical doctors are based upon good 
scientific evidence.21 If the dichotomy discussed in 
the New Zealand Guidelines is accepted, then these 
treatments are in the same category as CAM 
 
18 Medical Council of New Zealand, n 14, p 2. 
19 Medical Council of New Zealand, n 14, p 3. 
20 Australian Medical Association, Position Statement: 
Complementary Medicine (2002), para 1.1 .  
21 E J Mulligan, I Rower and J Sackett, “Inpatient Medicine is 
Evidence Based” (1995) 346 Lancet 407; R Smith, “Where is the 
Wisdom…? The Poverty of Medical Evidence” (1991) 303 BMJ 
798. 
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procedures, except perhaps that they may enjoy the 
support of the medical profession. 
Does a medical practitioner have an 
obligation to discuss CAM options 
with a patient?  
One form of CAM that has been readily accepted 
by the medical profession is acupuncture. Its 
acceptance is reflected in the fact that Medicare 
provides benefits for acupuncture treatments by 
medical doctors.22 
The efficacy of acupuncture is supported by a 
substantial degree of scientific evidence, 
particularly in the areas of pain management, nausea 
and vomiting.23 There are risks associated with 
acupuncture but these risks are considered to be less 
than the risks associated with Western medicine.24 
Consistent with the position discussed above, one 
could conclude that a medical doctor should discuss 
acupuncture as an option for treatment in those 
cases where it has proven to be effective. If the 
practitioner is not able to perform acupuncture for 
want of training, a referral to a medical 
acupuncturist could be made if the patient indicates 
a preference for that form of treatment.  
Chiropractic, homeopathy and herbal 
medicine  
The crux of the legal and ethical issue for 
medical practitioners is whether they are entitled or 
obliged to advise of CAM modalities as treatment 
options when their efficacy and safety may be in 
dispute. Complementary and alternative medicine 
treatments range from those that are totally 
unproven, to those reliant upon anecdotal and 
traditional use, to those bas ed upon scientific proof 
of variable quality. There is a substantial body of 
scientific evidence (often disputed) for the efficacy 
of chiropractic,25 homeopathy26 and herbal 
 
22 Health Insurance Act 2000 (Cth); General Medical Services 
Table Regulation (Cth), Item 173, Sch 1, Group A7. 
23 Bensoussan and Myers, n 1, pp 260-315. 
24 Bensoussan and Myers, n 1, p 83. 
25 There is good scientific evidence for the effectiveness of 
chiropractic, especially for lower back pain: J W Spencer and  
J J Jacobs, Complementary/Alternative Medicine: An Evidence-
Based Approach (Mosby, St Louis, 1999), p 5. Other sources of 
evidence, eg, T W Meade, “Low Back Pain of Mechanical 
Origin: Randomized Comparison of Chiropractic and Hospital 
Outpatient Treatment” (1990) 300 BMJ 1431, indicate that 
medicine27 that could arguably provide the basis for 
an obligation to discuss these treatment options 
where there is scientific evidence of efficacy and 
safety. 
The legal authorities on this point do not 
differentiate between the types of remedies that 
should be discussed as options for treatment so as to 
indicate the necessity to discuss CAM options. It 
would appear necessary to draw a line around the 
type of treatment options that a medical practitioner 
would not be obliged to discuss with a client. Haigh 
suggests that 
“perhaps the time is ripe for a more expansive 
conception of a patient’s right to make decisions. 
In fact, statutory provisions regarding disclosure 
and information are drafted widely and can be 
interpreted in this way. A vastly different, or 
wider, view of disclosure could extend the idea 
that patient information, to be meaningful, must 
be based on the provision of all necessary 
information. Competent adult patients should be 
entitled to decide (and refuse) not simply 
between competing orthodox treatments, or 
between treatment and no treatment, but also 
between the specific form of medical procedure, 
including orthodox or alternative.”28 
 
chiropractic may be more effective than hospital outpatient 
treatment, resulting in savings.   
26 J Kleijnen, A J M de Ceanen, J van Everdingen and L Krol, 
“Placebo Effect in Double-blind Clinical Trials: A Review of 
Interactions with Medication” (1994) ii Lancet 1347 have 
described 108 controlled homeopathy trials (68 randomised) for a 
number of ailments. Of these studies, 81 had positive effects and 
24 lacked positive effects. Most were completed using fastidious 
techniques and with placebo controls. C Hill and F Doyon, 
“Review of 38 Randomized Trials of Homeopathy” (1990) Revue 
D’Epidemilogie et de sante Publiquemade 139 in 1990 made a 
meta-analysis of 40 randomised clinical trials but did not find 
evidence for homeopathy efficacy. From a fastidious perspective, 
success over placebo has not been demonstrated but there may be 
methodological problems and some doubt as to whether the party 
providing the therapy has sufficient knowledge of the therapy. 
The scientific evidence for homeopathy has been criticised on the 
basis it often deals with illnesses that are highly subjective in 
nature: T J Kaptchuk, R A Edwards and D M Eisenberg, 
“Complementary Medicine: Efficacy Beyond the Placebo Effect” 
in E Ernst (ed), Complementary Medicine: An Objective 
Appraisal (Reed Educational and Professional Publishing, 
Oxford, 1996), pp 46-47, 50. 
27 E Ernst, “The Risk-Benefit Profile of Commonly Used Herbal 
Therapies: Gingko, St John’s Wort, Gingseng, Echinacea, Saw 
Palmetto and Kava” (2002) 136 Annals of Internal Medicine  42. 
28 R A Haigh, “Alternative Medicine and the Doctrine of Patient 
Disclosure” (2000) 8 JLM 197 at 203. 
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Haigh acknowledges the practical difficulties in 
requiring Western medical practitioners to provide 
that advice as they may lack the requisite training. 
He summarises the issue as follows: 
“In essence, we could ask ourselves whether a 
reasonable doctor, practising medicine in the 21st 
century, in light of increasing knowledge 
regarding patient behaviour and alternative 
medicines, should be aware of, and advise 
patients of, the presence of alternative 
approaches.”29 
Autonomy and CAM options  
Haigh argues strongly that the principle of 
autonomy supports the maximum level of 
information to allow people to make decisions about 
their health. He suggests this should be reflected in 
the obligation of medical practitioners to discuss the 
orthodox and the alternative forms of treatment. 
Presumably he would consider that a medical 
practitioner not versed in a CAM remedy could 
obtain the necessary information or refer the patient 
to a person who practises that therapy.  
The greater emphasis upon personal autonomy is 
well founded. Too often the cultural authority 
wielded by scientific medicine has seen it make 
assumptions about its ability to sift what is 
appropriate for a patient to digest as part of the 
decis ion-making process. The concept of 
therapeutic privilege is an example of this.30  
If the question is whether a medical practitioner 
currently has an obligation to discuss a wide range 
of alternative forms of therapy, the answer would be 
in the negative – but with a rider. There appears to 
be no reason why a CAM therapy should not be 
discussed by a doctor with a patient if it is based 
upon well-researched scientific evidence of efficacy 
and safety. This criterion applies to acupuncture for 
certain ailments and procedures and arguably 
chiropractic, homeopathy and herbal medicine. 
Without such advice, a client has not been provided 
with the full range of options, each with their own 
risks, success rates and advantages.31 With the 
 
29 Haigh, n 28, at 203. 
30 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 490, 494. 
31 M H Cohen, Beyond Complementary Medicine: Legal and 
Ethical Perspectives on Health Care and Human Evolution 
(2000), p 33. 
history of criticism and suspicion between OM and 
CAM,  
“[t]o demand that such therapies receive general 
medical acceptance before requiring their 
inclusion in informed consent disclosure 
effectively will cut off many patients from access 
to information about the therapies’ risks and 
benefits. To broaden the disclosure obligation, in 
contrast, would counter the historical medical 
parochialism toward complementary and 
alternative medicine and enhance patient access 
to the information being filtered through their 
physicians about such therapies.”32 
In regard to some forms of CAM, such as 
spiritual healing, that do not have this level of 
scientific acceptance, it is not possible to provide 
clients with this information. The advice on this 
issue could offer only generalisations or vague 
references to traditional, anecdotal use and safety 
issues. This dearth of scientific evidence may 
reduce in the future as further research continues. 
Doctors should provide information about CAM 
options if asked by the patient and should proffer 
the evidence that exists for a particular treatment. 
The AMA supports further education in CAM for 
medical practitioners for this purpose.33 A medical 
practitioner could provide information on the CAM 
options for treatment and give his or her view of 
their dangers and advantages. If the use of unproven 
remedies was contemplated by a patient, an 
important consideration would be whether 
attempting such a remedy in the case of a 
progressive illness would decrease the chances of 
successful orthodox treatment if the CAM remedy 
proved unsuccessful.  
Any such advice should indicate the limitations 
on the extent of scientific evidence and safety 
issues. Although it is unlikely that the medical 
practitioner would be in a position to provide these 
therapies, respect for a patient’s autonomy (even if 
the patient was contemplating a step the doctor 
might consider unwise) would suggest not 
dismissing his or her interest. In the words of the 
Medical Council of New Zealand guidelines: 
“Where patients are seeking to make a choice 
between evidence-based medicine or alternative 
medicine, the doctor should present all the 
 
32 Cohen, n 31, p 39.  
33 Australian Medical Association, n 20, para 4.4. 
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information available concerning his or her 
recommended treatment thus allowing the 
patient, as a competent and consenting adult, to 
make an informed choice which should then be 
treated respectfully.”34 
Do CAM practitioners have an 
obligation to advise of the OM options 
for treatment?  
This was an issue raised in a review by 
Freckelton35 of the author’s book entitled 
Complementary Medicine: Ethics and Law.36 This 
text 37 stated that it would be unreasonable for CAM 
practitioners, when fulfilling their obligation to 
advise of options for treatment, to advise on OM 
forms of treatment. For example, a chiropractor 
would not be obliged to discuss the risks and 
advantages of surgery for a back complaint when 
discussing the various options for treatment within 
the chiropractic model; nor would a homeopath be 
obliged to discuss the varying risks and success 
rates of antibiotics for ear infections. Freckelton 
commented:38 
“It is probable that Weir undervalues the extent 
of the obligations of health care practitioners in 
this regard. He does so in an important way. If 
complementary practitioners are what their name 
suggests, they ‘complement’ orthodox medicine. 
A key part in their training is, and should be, 
awareness not just of their own limitations but of 
what orthodox medicine can offer to the 
provision of co-ordinated or variegated 
treatment. The same applies to their actual 
provision of treatment. Few patients are in a 
position to evaluate their treatment modality 
options scientifically. They rely upon health care 
practitioners for the provision of sufficient 
reliable, dispassionate information for them to be 
able to exercise their decision-making in an 
informed manner. If this information is not made 
available to patients, their ability to discern 
amongst their options is compromised and their 
 
34 See n 14, p 1.  
35 See (2000) 8 JLM 224. 
36 See also The Law Report, “Health Law under the Microscope”, 
Radio National, 6 Dec 2000. 
37 M J Weir, Complementary Medicine: Ethics and Law 
(Prometheus Publications, Brisbane, 2000), p 97. 
38 (2000) 8 JLM 224 at 225. 
autonomy diminished. At this point the civil law 
is likely to intervene and hold them culpable.” 
Haigh appears to support this type of obligation for 
alternative medicine practitioners.39 
There are a number of reasons for rejecting this 
proposition. 
Medical doctors are unlimited 
practitioners  
The obligation of medical doctors to advise of 
potential options for treatment including, arguably, 
some CAM options, derives from the role of 
medical doctors and the assumption that they are 
entitled to perform any medical procedure. There 
may be practical, ethical and professional reasons 
why a general practitioner does not perform brain 
surgery but there is nothing legally to stop him or 
her doing so.  
A registered medical practitioner is exempted 
from the scope of practice provisions of the Health 
Practitioner Registration Acts that specify those 
persons entitled to perform particular health-related 
activities such as: 
· dentistry;40  
· physiotherapy;41  
· chiropractic and osteopathy;42 and  
· podiatry.43 
Most doctors are not trained to perform these 
disciplines or are trained at a less sophisticated level 
than the specifically trained health professional. 
Few would argue that a medical doctor is better 
trained to perform chiropractic procedures than 
chiropractors. The health sector is arranged so that a 
medical practitioner is entitled to supply the full 
gamut of services. All other registered health 
professions are given a subset of the medical 
profession’s whole.  
This hegemony supports a broad ethical and legal 
obligation upon medical doctors to outline the 
various options for treatment. If a medical 
practitioner is assumed to be entitled to provide 
virtually any form of therapy, it is not unreasonable 
 
39 Haigh, n 28, at 205. 
40 For example, s 57(4) of the Dentists Act 1989 (NSW): the 
practice of dentistry in accordance with the ordinary course of 
practice of a medical practitioner. 
41 Public Health Act 1991 (NSW), s 10AC. 
42 Chiropractors and Osteopaths Registration Act 1997 (Tas),  
s 56(2). 
43 Podiatrists Act 1989 (NSW), s 4(2). 
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to expect a broad discussion of treatment options. If 
a general practitioner is not sufficiently experienced 
or knowledgeable to discuss the various options for 
treatment and their risks, the general practitioner 
would be expected to refer the patient to a specialist. 
Patients will usually expect medical doctors to 
indicate what medical science currently considers is 
the appropriate form of treatment, whether it be 
surgical, pharmaceutical or nutritional.  
Physiotherapy: Comparison of 
obligations  
If a CAM practitioner is said to have an 
obligation to advise of orthodox medicine options 
for treatment, does this also apply to a 
physiotherapist? A physiotherapist is an allied 
health professional trained from an orthodox 
medicine perspective. A physiotherapist relies upon 
referrals from medical doctors or receives patients 
directly as a primary health practitioner without 
referral. This means that physiotherapists will deal 
with matters that could require medical intervention. 
If the obligation to advise patients of treatment 
options is applied consistently, then physiotherapists 
should discuss options for treatment, such as 
surgery, with a patient.  
There is no such practice, protocol or 
understanding that physiotherapists are obliged to 
advise of the various orthodox medicine treatment 
options. They may be in breach of their professional 
duty if they do not refer to a medical doctor when a 
condition requiring medical assistance arises. 
The scope of practice of physiotherapists was 
discussed in  Re Ward,44 involving an appeal by a 
physiotherapist against his suspension from practice 
for unprofessional conduct. The physiotherapist 
treated a child with cancer outside the scope of his 
training and in breach of the statutory scope of 
practice provisions. Abbott J held that the definition 
of physiotherapy provided a statutory limit to the 
practice of physiotherapy.  
This approach has an expansive aspect in that, 
within the statutory scope of practice, a registered 
physiotherapist is not limited by a lack of training. 
For example, if the statutory definition permitted the 
use of ultrasonic equipment, the practitioner could 
provide this treatment even if he or she had no 
 
44 (1953) SASR 308. 
training in that equipment. The limiting aspect of 
this approach is that a physiotherapist could not use 
techniques outside that statutory definition. Abbott J 
stated:45  
“[I]t is immaterial what the previous training of 
the practitioner may have been; when practising 
as a physiotherapist and holding himself out as 
so practising, he is confined to the forms of 
treatment comprised in the definition of 
physiotherapy laid down in the Act.” 
This suggests a narrow obligation to give advice on 
medical treatment options but a broad obligation to 
refer to a medical practitioner in appropriate cases. 
The limited role of a CAM practitioner 
in law 
A CAM practitioner may not be entitled by law 
to perform the broad range of treatments that may 
be available for a particular malady. In South 
Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory, only medical doctors are entitled to 
“practise medicine” or “to provide medical 
treatment”.46 In these jurisdictions, it is an offence 
for a CAM practitioner to provide medical services, 
to practise medicine and in some cases to give 
medical advice. The equivalent Queensland and 
Victorian statutes do not prohibit medical practice 
by unregistered persons, suggesting that the 
common law entitlement to practise medicine 
continues other than a statutory prohibition against 
“holding out”.47  
Definition by the courts 
There is no clear authority on what constitutes 
“the practice of medicine” in the context of 
complementary medicine.  
Any treatment of human ailments might arguably 
constitute the practice of medicine, but common 
sense suggests that this term requires some 
limitation. The Macquarie Dictionary48 defines 
medicine as “the art or science of restoring or 
preserving health or due physical condition, by 
 
45 (1953) SASR 308 at 320-321. 
46 Medical Practitioners Act 1983 (SA), s 31(1); Medical Act 
1894 (WA), s 19; Medical Practitioners Act 1996 (Tas), s 63; 
Medical Act 1995 (NT), s 56; Medical Practitioners Act 1930 
(ACT), s 46. 
47 Younghusband v Luftig [1949] 2 KB 72. 
48 Macquarie University, New South Wales, 1988. 
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means of drugs, surgical operations or appliances, 
manipulations etc (often divided into medicine 
proper, surgery and obstetrics)”. This broad 
definition covers virtually all Western medicine 
modalities. The practice of a profession may require 
some habitual or customary exercise of a craft,49 
suggesting that isolated activities might not 
constitute the practice of medicine.  
The constant concern for a CAM practitioner is 
to avoid the implication that he or she is “practising 
medicine”. There appears to be a reluctance by 
professional boards to commence actions in regard 
t o  those provisions because of the difficulty in 
proving that the practice of medicine has occurred.50 
This concern is probably greatest in South Australia 
where the prohibition is in regard to medical 
treatment and it is defined to include “all medical or 
surgical advice”. This provision would suggest that 
advice as to options for treatment could breach this 
provision if the advice canvassed CAM and medical 
options.  
In addition to the specific provisions relating to 
the “practice of medicine”, all States provide that it 
is an offence to “hold out” as a medical 
practitioner.51 This is a separate offence from the 
practising of medicine by an unregistered person. 
This provision continues to be enforced by the 
various medical boards and is problematic for CAM 
practitioners. These provisions cover not only the 
obvious case of a CAM practitioner using the term 
“MD” or “Dr” falsely to suggest that he or she is a 
registered doctor. A “holding out” could occur 
where “medical” titles are not used based upon the 
act of providing medical treatment.52  
Shakoor v Situ 
The current statutory background supports the 
role of CAM practitioners who are obliged to advise 
of treatment options within the range of their 
modality but remain cognisant that they are 
practising within an OM context. This was the 
sentiment in Shakoor v Situ,53 the most significant 
common law case on CAM practitioners.  
 
49 Knott v Physiotherapists Registration Board  [1961] WAR 70. 
50 Queensland Health, Health Review of Medical and Health 
Practitioner Registration Acts, Draft Policy Paper (1996), pp 55-
56. 
51 For example, Medical Practice Act 1994 (Vic), s 62. 
52 Smith’s Newspapers v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279. 
53 [2000] 4 All ER 181. 
Shakoor v Situ involved a claim by the widow of 
Abdul Shakoor who died after receiving a course of 
Chinese herbal medicine from the defendant. She 
contended that his death was caused by the 
negligence of the defendant thereby entitling her to 
claim for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 
1976 (UK) and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1934 (UK). 
The defendant was trained in China in both 
traditional and modern medicine and had been 
practising in the United Kingdom for a number of 
years. He was not a registered medical practitioner 
but was a member of a relevant TCM professional 
association.  
The deceased consulted the defendant about 
multiple benign lipomata (fatty deposits below the 
skin). He had been told by his general practitioner 
that the only remedy for this condition was surgery. 
The defendant prescribed a decoction of 12 herbs to 
be taken on alternate days. After taking the herbs, 
the deceased became ill and eventually suffered 
liver failure. He died after a liver transplant.  
The judge, Bernard Livesey QC, summarised the 
case as follows:54 
“The case for the claimant must therefore stand 
and fall on the allegation that it was negligent of 
the defendant to prescribe the decoction; 
alternatively to do so without warning the 
deceased of the risk of the injury to which 
ingestion of the decoction would expose him.” 
The significant argument presented by the 
plaintiff was that the defendant had held himself out 
as the equivalent of a general medical practitioner 
specialising in skin complaints and should be 
judged by the standards of reasonably competent 
medical practitioners in that field in the United 
Kingdom. It was argued that, on that test, he should 
have known about the possibility of injury as 
medical journals such as The Lancet had warned of 
the known risk of liver damage and, in one case, of 
death involving the ingestion of similar herbal 
medicine.  
If accepted, this type of test could expose a CAM 
practitioner to liability for negligence even if he or 
she was acting in accordance with the requirements 
of the profession. This approach, if generally 
adopted, would confirm the superior status of OM 
over alternative forms of healing.  
 
54 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 185. 
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The defendant also argued that, as the plaintiff 
had not provided evidence of appropriate 
professional practice from a TCM practitioner, it 
was not possible to find negligence against the 
defendant as evidence from a similar area of 
expertise was required.55  
The judge did not accept that TCM practitioners 
should be judged by the same standards as medical 
doctors:  
“The Chinese herbalist, for example, does not 
hold himself out as a practitioner of orthodox 
medicine. More particularly, the patient has 
usually had the choice of going to an orthodox 
practitioner but has rejected him in favour of the 
alternative practitioner for reasons personal and 
best known to himself and almost certainly at 
some personal financial cost. Those reasons may 
include a passionate belief in the superiority of 
the alternative therapy or a fear of surgery or 
reliance (perhaps dependence) on orthodox 
chemical medications which may have known 
undesirable side-effects either short or long term 
or both. (In the instant case, where the deceased 
was not known have been predisposed to favour 
alternative medicine, his motivation may, for all 
we know, have been a fear of surgery or merely a 
desire to avoid the delays attendant nowadays on 
non-urgent surgical cases.) The decision of the 
patient may be enlightened and informed or 
based on ignorance and superstition. Whatever 
the basis of the decision, it seems to me that the 
fact that the patient has chosen to reject the 
orthodox and prefer the alternative practitioner is 
something important which must be taken into 
account. Why should he later be able to complain 
that the alternative practitioner has not provided 
him with skill and care in accordance with the 
standards of those orthodox practitioners whom 
he has rejected?”56 
While rejecting the application of the OM 
standard of care, the judge acknowledged:  
“[I]t will … often (perhaps invariably) not be 
enough to judge him by the standard of the 
ordinary practitioner ‘skilled in that particular 
art’, it will often be necessary to have regard to 
the fact that the practitioner is practising his art 
alongside orthodox medicine, the court will need 
 
55 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 187. 
56 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 188. 
to consider whether the standard of care adopted 
by the alternative practitioner has taken account 
of the implications of this fact. The implications 
may vary depending upon the area of expertise 
and specific art or omission which is under 
scrutiny in the individual case.”57 
The judge then continued with the question of what 
the content of the duty of an alternative medicine 
practitioner is in the context of this case. He 
considered there were three important points that 
needed to be made in the context of a practitioner 
prescribing a chemical or herbal remedy for internal 
consumption: 
1. Practitioners need to recognise they are holding 
themselves out to practise within a system of 
law and medicine which will review the 
standard of care that has been taken in relation 
to a client. 
2. Where a remedy is prescribed, it is not enough 
to say that the remedy is traditional and 
considered not harmful: it is the practitioner’s 
duty to ensure the remedy is, in fact, not 
harmful or potentially harmful. 
3. Practitioners must recognise the probability that 
any person suffering an adverse reaction to 
such a remedy is likely to find his or her way 
into an orthodox hospital and the incident may 
be written up in an orthodox medical journal. 
Practitioners should take steps to ascertain this 
evidence which could be satisfied by being a 
member of an association that searches the 
relevant literature and reports any relevant 
material to the practitioner.58  
The judge then said a claimant could succeed in a 
claim against an alternative practitioner either by 
calling an expert in the modality specialty in 
question (this was not done in this case) or by 
proving that the prevailing standard of care and skill 
in the art in question was deficient in regard to the 
risks that should have been taken into account. The 
latter argument was what the plaintiff relied upon in 
this case. 
In regard to the obligation to warn of the possible 
side-effects, the judge considered: 
“[T]he adverse reaction of the type which 
occurred is such a rare event that I do not believe 
that a doctor would be obliged to give a warning 
 
57 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 188-189. 
58 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 189. 
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and, if a warning were to be given, the risk could 
legitimately have been presented as so small that 
I do not believe that an appropriate warning 
would have had the effect of dissuading anyone, 
let alone the deceased, from making the 
treatment.”59 
The significance of this decision is that: 
· It confirms the approach taken in the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court of South Australia in 
Bawden v Marin60 that a similar test applied to 
medical doctors will be applied to CAM 
practitioners but based upon the expertise not of 
a medical practitioner but a reasonably 
competent member of the CAM specialty under 
consideration. 
· That practitioners are not able to ignore scientific 
evidence that may be provided by OM which 
should impact upon the content of their duty of 
care to their client.  
· It is important in any proceedings brought 
against a CAM practitioner to obtain expert  
evidence of what is or is not competent practice 
for that modality. 
· A court will assess whether a particular 
professional practice is appropriate. This case 
echoes the principles discussed by the High 
Court in Rogers v Whitaker which does not 
accord the medical profession the role of the 
sole arbiter of competent practice. 
A CAM practitioner should be appropriately 
trained to reflect high standards for his or her 
modality. Where appropriate, this training should 
incorporate sufficient biomedical education to assist 
in identifying conditions that should be attended to 
by a medical practitioner with a clear understanding 
that in no case should a patient be dissuaded from 
attending a medical practitioner. A CAM 
practitioner should understand that if the condition 
does not respond or worsens, a referral to a medical 
practitioner should occur.  
Boundaries between CAM and OM: The 
United States example  
The appropriate professional boundaries between 
medical practitioners and CAM practitioners has 
been an important issue for chiropractors in the 
 
59 [2000] 4 All ER 181 at 191-192. 
60 Unreported, Full Court, SA, 1447 of 1989. 
United States. If a patient attends at a chiropractor 
and it becomes obvious that the complaint is more 
appropriately dealt with by a medical practitioner, a 
chiropractor is obliged to refer the patient to a 
medical practitioner.  
Chiropractors are educated in anatomy, 
chiropractic diagnosis and the treatment of spinal-
related conditions.61 Their level of training is 
usually at a university bachelor degree standard for 
a period of five to six years. Although the type of 
training and education provided to chiropractors has 
been criticised by OM and may lack the 
sophistication of medical training in some respects, 
chiropractors are registered health professionals in 
virtually all Western countries.62  
Despite this background, chiropractors are not 
normally considered to have an obligation to 
indicate OM options for treatment. Chiropractors 
are regarded as having an obligation to:63  
· identify problems that are medical and those that 
are amenable to chiropractic; 
· withhold treatment when they should reasonably 
be aware that chiropractic is not indicated and 
may aggravate the condition; and 
· refer patients to a medical practitioner when 
medical treatment is indicated. 
In the United States, closely defined and 
enforced definitions of “the practice of medicine” 
make attempts at medical diagnosis legally 
hazardous. Once the chiropractic diagnosis is made, 
the chiropractor should determine if chiropractic can 
assist. If not, the chiropractor should explain this to 
the client. If chiropractic treatment is deemed likely 
to be beneficial, the limits of chiropractic should be 
explained and the client encouraged not to abandon 
medical options after advice from a medical 
practitioner.  
 
 
61 D Chapman-Smith, The Chiropractic Profession: Its 
Education, Practice, Research and Future Directions (NCMIC 
Group Inc, West Des Moines, Iowa, 2000), p 46;  
A M Kleynhans, J D Sweaney and R G Hunt, “Chiropractic”, in  
I Freckelton and H Selby (eds), Expert Evidence (subscription 
service, Lawbook Co., Sydney, 1993-), Ch 42. 
62 Chapman-Smith, n 61, p 30.  
63 H M Rian, “An Alternative Contractual Approach to Holistic 
Health Care” (1983) 44 Ohio State Law Journal 186 at 192; 
Mostrom v Pettibon  25 Wash App 158; 607 P 2d 864 (1980); 
Kelly v Carroll 36 Wash Ed 482; 219 P 2d 79 (1950). 
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Different categories of CAM  
There is a wide range of modalities that are, for 
the purposes of discussion, placed under the heading 
of CAM. Within this designation there is an 
extraordinary continuum of sophistication in 
training and healing philosophy. Some modalities 
such as therapeutic massage, reflexology and 
feldenkrais are inherently limited in scope. 
Practitioners of these modalities generally do not 
make broad claims about the potential benefits of 
their modality. It is most difficult to apply with any 
practicality any broad obligations to advise on the 
broad range of treatment options. These 
practitioners have no pretensions to being trained 
for that purpose and their aim is to provide non-
invasive techniques often with no more specific 
therapeutic goal than the promotion of health and 
harmony. To require these types of practitioners to 
undertake the onerous task of advising on treatment 
options would be unrealistic and potentially 
dangerous. Despite this, a strong appreciation of 
their limitations and obligations to encourage 
continuing contact with OM and the need to refer on 
when appropriate is important. 
Slightly different considerations might apply for 
those CAM modalities that have a claim to be an 
entire healing system or where practitioners’ level 
of training and education is long and at a high level. 
Chiropractic, osteopathy and TCM might be 
deemed to satisfy this description. Although most 
practitioners in these disciplines would state that 
their purpose is to promote harmony for the patient, 
these practitioners will apply specific techniques to 
achieve clear therapeutic goals in relation to 
diagnosed maladies. For the reasons discussed 
above, this group should not be burdened with the 
same level of obligation to describe the options for 
treatment within another school of healing. This 
group of practitioners needs to understand their 
legal and ethical obligations to refer to a medical 
practitioner, however, when the patient does not 
respond to treatment or the condition is outside their 
scope of practice.  
Conclusion 
The trend towards the use of CAM as a health 
treatment option is likely to increase. With this 
increase will come integration of CAM into the 
health sector through further statutory regulation of 
CAM practitioners.64 For this reason, some 
rationalisation of the relationship between CAM and 
OM is  necessary so that both practitioners and 
clients understand their entitlements and 
obligations. Part of this reform should involve 
further education of CAM practitioners to 
understand their role and obligations for the benefit 
of patients. The elimination of the long-term distrust 
that has developed between OM and CAM would 
assist both OM and CAM to maximise the delivery 
of healing and autonomy to the consumers of health 
services.  
Instead of attempting to apply a “one-size-fits-
all” approach to the question of options for 
treatment, the niche provided by CAM practitioners 
should be respected. Complementary and alternative 
medicine practitioners, though, should also respect 
the need to educate themselves about the limits of 
their modality and the obligation to work within a 
broad framework that does not ignore the role of 
OM in some cases. This may involve referral to OM 
practitioners, co-treatment or co-operative 
treatment. It is to be hoped that the 
professionalisation and legitimacy which comes 
with higher standards of education in CAM 
professions and the contribution of advances in 
scientific evidence will forge these connections for 
the benefit of avoiding maleficence and promoting 
beneficence for an autonomous client. 
  
 
64 Australian Medical Association, n 20, para 2.2. 
